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ABSTRACT
Modem communications satellites rely heavily upon
deployable appendage (i.e. solar arrays, communications
antennas, etc.) to perform vital functions that enable the
spacecraft to effectively conduct mission objectives.
Communications and telemetry antennas provide the radio-
frequency link between the spacecraft and the earth ground
station, permitting data to be transmitted and received from
the satellite. Solar arrays serve a`s the principle source of
electrical energy to the satellite, and re-charge internal bat-
teries during operation. However, since satellites cannot
carry back-up systems, if a solar array tails to deploy, the
mission is lost.
This article examines the subject of on-orbit anomalies
related to the deployment of spacecraft appendage, and
possible causes of such failures. Topics discus_d shall
include mechanical launch loading, on-orbit thermal and
solar concerns, reliability of spacecraft pyrotechnics, and
practical limitations of ground-based deployment testing.
Of particular significance, the article will feature an in-
depth look at the lessons learned from the successful recov-
ery of the Telesat Canada Anik-E2 satellite in 1991.
_TRODUCTION
Although spacecraft failures occur in m,'my different
ways, the majority of satellite anomalies in recent years
have occurred during the early launch stages. Launch vehi-
cles have exploded several seconds after liftoff; others have
been destroyed remotely after going awry by safety engi-
neers; and still some have never even left the launch pad.
The unfortunate consequence of this destructive process is
that the payload, usually one or more multi-million dollar
communication satellites, is also lost.
In a similar respect, the spacecraft that have managed to
safely make it into orbit amide the severity of vehicle
launch, have themselves found unique ways to fail. The
Japanese Superbird A satellite became useless in space
after expelling critical oxidizing propellant in late
December 1990, resulting in a $170 million insurance
claim by owner Space Communications Corporation,
Tokyo (ref. 1); electrical problems crippled the European
Space Agency's (ESA) Olympus satellite in 1991 for two
months, before ground engineers were able to regain con-
trol of the spacecr,'fft (ref. 2); and propulsion problems
caused the ESA Hipparcos satellite to be placed in the
wrong orbit in 1989, forcing officials to resort to a "revised
mission" in order for the spacecraft to achieve it's objec-
tives (ref. 3).
However, the most puzzling and sub_quenfly the most
unpredictable flight anomalies have generally involved
malfunctions related to spacecraft appendage deployment
(i.e. solar arrays, communication antennas, booms, etc.).
Table 1 shows a partial list of spacecraft failures of late
(1980-present) which were attributed to their inability to
deploy appendage on orbit. The table is based upon a previ-
ous database compiled by Thomas W. Trafton of the
Aerospace Corporation (ref. 4). Of significance, the West
German TVSat 1 satellite failed to deploy one of its two
outer, four-segment solar array panels after orbital insertion
by an Ariane 2 vehicle on November 20, 1987. This cata-
strophic event, which also prevented the satellite's receive
antenna from being deployed, eventually forced the space-
craft's owners, the Eurosatellite European consortium, to
abandon the satellite in space several months later. The
satellite, valued at $230 million, was eventually claimed as
a $51 million in-orbit insurance loss (ref. 5).
In April 1991, two well-publicized spacecraft deployment
problems occurred which involved the Telesat Canada
Anik-E2 satellite and the NASA Galileo Jupiter spacecraft.
The Anik-E2 experienced difficulties deploying both of its
K-band and C-band antenna.s, while ground controllers at
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) were unable to proper-
ly unfurl the high gain antenna of the Galileo spacecraft.
Circumstances and events surrounding these failures have
been well documented in public literature, and it would be
redundant to re-examine them here. Also, the author feels
that individuals within these two organizations are the best
sources for such detailed information and mission status.
ttowever, several important lessons learned from the suc-
cessful Anik-E2 recovery shall be discussed in a later _c-
tion of this paper.
There have also been several less announced instances of
spacecraft experiencing problems deploying appendage,
most of these payloads were launched from the U.S. Space
Transportation System (STS) or Space Shuttle. Due to the
advent of the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s, numerous
on-orbit catastrophes have been auspiciously avoided.
Various satellites failed to deploy solar arrays, antennas,
etc., when commanded, despite futile maneuvers by ground
controllers. The Shuttle's Remote Manipulator Arm or
"Canadarm", designed and built by Spar Aerospace of
Canada, was a major contributor to the successful operation
of these problem satellites. As demonstrated in 1984 by
Space Shuttle Challenger astronaut, Sally Ride, the manip-
ulator arm was u._d to shake free one of the 21-ft solar
arrays of NASA's 2.5 ton Earth Radiation Budget Satellite
(ERBS) (ref. 6).
Extra-vehicular activity (EVA) has also rescued several
doomed spacecraft, when salvage attempts using the
Shuttle manipulator arm were unfruitful. As an instance, in
April 1991, U.S. Space Shuttle Atlantis astronauts, Jerome
Apt and Jerry Ross, were forced to perform EVA to manu-
ally free the stuck high-gain antenna of the $617 million
NASA Gamma Ray Observatory, after orbiter maneuvers
utilizing the Shuttle's manipulator ann did not shake it free
(ref. 7). To NASA officials and owners of satellites
launched from the U.S. Space Shuttle, the STS has definite-
ly proved its utility. Without the benefit of the Shuttle's
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EVAandmanipulatoranncapabilities,themissionsuccess
ofseveralNASAlaunchedpayloadswouldhaveobviously
beenleftindoubt.Manyvaluablel ssonshavebeen
learnedfromthesexperiencesandtheywillbebecome
keytoolsinthedesignoffuturereusablespaceorbiters,
includingtheESA'sHermesandJapaneseHOPEspace-
planes.
Inlightofthisstringofon-orbitdifficulties,thereisa
growingconcernthroughoutthespacecommunityastothe
sourceofsuchproblems.Butduetotherandomnatureof
suchaberrations,thereisnotpresentlyatrendforwhich
onecanfindacommoncause.Thebesthatonecanhope
todoisconcentrateonaparticulartypeofspacecraftfail-
ure,inthiscase,deploymentfailures.
Inaccordancewiththisagenda,theauthorhaschosento
limitthefollowingdiscussiontoappendagefailuresonly.
Sinceit hasnotbeenpossiblewhilepreparingthispaperfor
theauthortoreviewtheliteraturefullyinthisfield,thepre-
sentreviewcannotclaimtobeexhaustive.It is intended
onlytoexamineprobablecausesandeventsurrounding
theseriesofspaceanomalies,andsuggestfeasiblesolu-
tionstoprecludesuchdisastersfromoccurringinthe
future.
THE PROBLEM WITH DEPLOYABLES
Deployable spacecraft appendage such as antennas, solar
arrays and booms perform many functions essential to mis-
sion success. Remote satellite operation is achieved
through the use of RF communication and telemetry anten-
nas to earth ground stations. In general, they provide the
only communication link between Earth and the satellite.
Booms are used to deploy scientific experiments, probes,
sensors, antennas, etc.. Solar arrays are the primary electri-
cal power source for the majority of spacecraft. They also
charge the spacecraft's batteries, so that they can provide
the energy necessary for a similar level of payload opera-
tion during eclipse periods. The importance of proper solar
array deployment cannot be overemphasized in that, failure
to deploy an array on-orbit ordinarily results in inability to
accomplish mission objectives.
Although appendage devices are extremely critical to
spacecraft orbital operation, they suffer from several inher-
ent drawbaclcs. The most obvious is their increased
mechanical complexity. Beginning in the early 1960s,
spacecraft designs were initially very conservative. They
were low-power, low-weight, mechanically simple and had
on-orbit lifetimes of only 6 to 8 months. As launch vehicle
maximum payload capabilities increased, so did the size
and complexity of satellites. Today, solar array and antenna
designers have continued to become more intricate and dar-
ing in their designs, despite the problems manufacturers are
currently lacing in deploying such devices on-orbit. In rela-
tion to scientific satellites, and to some extent communica-
tion satellites, the trend has been to achieve more objec-
fives with single missions, while attaining longer lifetimes
in the harsh space environment, with extreme reliability.
Figure 1 shows an artist's impression of NASA's pro-
posed Space Station Freedom, an ambitious joint venture
between the U.S., Japan, Europe and Canada. The $30 bil-
lion station will possess six solar arrays, each spanning 39
ft. W X 112 ft L, and an assortment of booms and antennas.
In this scaled-down version of the newly proposed space
structure (original configuration utilized 8 solar arrays), the
solar arrays are the prime electrical source for the 56
Kilowatt power plant. Critics are concerned that if space-
craft manufacturers are currently having trouble coping
with the relatively simple deployment problems they have
recently faced, how can they realistically attempt to design
and build such a complex structure as the Space Station?
Deployable components are also very fragile devices.
They generally cannot support their own weight while in
Earth's gravity. To prevent mechanical damage during
vehicle launch, they must be kept in a stowed configura-
tion, immobilized by various locking apparatuses (cables,
pins, locking mechanisms, etc.). Once in space, these
devices are released from their latched position through a
series of carefully planned explosive charges (pyrotech-
nics). Deployment motors are designed to exert low forces
on deployment mechanisms; usually only a few pounds.
Centrifugal forces and speeds used to aid in the transition
from the stowed transfer orbit configuration to full deploy-
ment are also kept low. Shock and vibration dampers are
used to attenuate the mechanical loads experienced by the
spacecraft as appendage reach their "end of travel". The
appendage itself must exhibit low contact resistance and
electrical noise during electrical transfer, and impose low
torques on the spacecraft.
The sequence of appendage deployment is additionally
important. During orbital transfer, a spacecraft must rely
entirely on its batteries for power. Thus, deployment
sequences must be performed within short time schedules.
Also, the firing of pyrotechnics to deploy booms, antennas
and solar arrays introduce small dynamic loads on the
spacecraft. However, these firings must not adversely effect
the operation of nearby structures, or interfere with the
deployment of other appendage. The basis on which these
sequence of events is planned is commonly the result of
extensive computer analyses and deployment tests conduct-
ed on engineering and qualification models.
Figure 2 shows the ESA's European Remote-Sensing
Satellite, ERS-1, deployment sequence during the "Launch
and Early-Orbit Phase", or "LEOP". The sequence of
deployments is driven primarily by the results of a
pyrotechnic shock analysis, which showed that the
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) antenna could be
deployed with the solar array already out, but the array
drive mechanisms had to be locked. The ground deploy-
ment testing of the SAR is shown in figure 3. Other impor-
tant factors include critical timing, satellite space visibility
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toone(locatedinSantiagodeChile)ofsevendifferent
groundstations,battery-l_wereddeployment,andthermal
stability.The|burantennaandsolararraydeployments
wereactivatedbypyrotechnicsandspringforces(ref.8).
Inadditiontotheforementioneddifficulties,appendage
deploymentmechanismsarealsosensitivetothethermal
environmentconditionsimposedduringspaceoperation.
Thermalgradients,highandlowtemperatureextremes,and
thehighvacuumofspacecancausemechanicalelementsto
lockorstall,ormetalsurfacestoweldtogether.Topre-
cludesuchcatastrophes,xhaustivethermalbalanceand
thermalvacuumtestingaredoneatsystemlevelpriorto
launch,toensureproperoperationonceinspace.
PROBLEM SOURCES
The 1986 U.S. Space Shuttle Challenger accident left a
vivid impression in the minds of many that space opera-
tions are not free from catastrophic failures. This incident,
along with Iailures of several expendable launch vehicles
which included the European Ariane Rocket, U.S.
Atlas/Centuar and Titan rockets compelled launch vehicle
manufacturers world-wide to nnake internal assessments of
their own quality, safety and reliability programs.
Following the two year hiatus imposed by the Challenger
accident, the number of launch vehicle failures decreased
significantly during the latter half of the 1980s. While this
trend has continued into the lC)90s, a new series of prob-
lems have recently emerged -- spacecrafl failures. The suc-
cessful launches of the late 80's seemingly gave manulac-
lurers a false sense of confidence concerning the orbital
performance of spacecraft. The latest chain of failures has
forced a shift in directives fi_r those involved in satellite
operations, ,and the question of space anomalies has now
become a major issue.
As previously mentioned, the discussion in this paper is
restricted to only those failures resulting from the space-
cralt's failure to deploy appendage. Even with such a nar-
row span of spacecrali failures, the realm of conceivable
reasons fi)r satellite deployment problems are far tcx) exten-
sive ft_r discussion here. For the sake of simplification, we
shall examine several known factors that can be directly
attributed, or highly suspected to be, possible causes of on-
orbit spacecraft appendage failures:
a) mechanical launch loads
b) on-orbit thermal and solar effects
c) inadequate ground-based testing
d) onboard spacecraft pyrotechnics
e) spacecraft outgassing.
MECHANICAL LAUNCH LOADS
In general, spacecraft are subjected to the most damaging
mechanical loads during the launch period. Due to their
delicate nature, satellite appendage is particularly suscepti-
ble to dynamic launch loading. However, since very few
spacecraft are ever returned to Earth, and satellite repair
and rescue missions such as demonstrated by the U.S.
Space Shuttle are far and few between, the extent of launch
loading damage to these devices is not a factor easily deter-
mined. But, past experience has shown that launch condi-
tions have produced profound effects on spacecraft. For
example, the first cluster of the U.S. Skylab, launched in
1973, suffered extensive physical damage as a result of the
severe vibroacoustic environment experienced by the struc-
ture during launch from a two-stage Saturn 5 rocket. The
launch vibrations caused the workshop's meteoroid/thermal
shield to be torn away, which in turn ripped away one of
the pair of solar array wings and caused the other to be
januned in a partially open position by debris. Two astro-
nauts later conducted EVA to free the jammed solar panel
(ref. 9).
In terms of causes of some of the current appendage
deployment problems, only one is considered suspect to the
effects of mechanical loading. The NASA Galileo Jupiter
spacecraft is presently speeding towards Earth for a
December 1992 gravitational- boost flyby, without the use
of its high gain antenna (HGA), stuck in a partially
unfurled position. Figure 4 shows a photograph of the flight
antenna fully unfurled at JPL, Pasadena, Califomia. Lateral
vibrations induced to the HGA structure during the four
cross-country truck trips the spacecraft made between
California and Florida, have presumably worn away the dry
lubricant (molydisulfide) that allows the HGA rib suptx_rt
pins to freely disengage from the central mast during
deployment (ref. 10).
It should bc noted that the majority of the deployment
problems previously outlined in table 1 were discovered
during the first few hours on orbit, during the transfer orbit
sequence. This has led many to believe that the cause of the
events occurred prior to orbital placement. In this respect,
the launch environment is deemed a logical problem
source. But again, no conclusive data is presently available
to confirm this theory.
The high-intensity noise pressure due to engine thrust or
aercxlymunic forces are the primary sources of spacecraft
structural vibration. But, generally speaking, the vibroa-
coustic launch environments and corresponding design pre-
cautions are regarded as being reasonably well understood
by the m(v,lern engineering community. Each have been
heavily documented in literature over the past two decades,
many valuable lessons learned have been applied, and a
high level of confidence is now believed to exist in this
area. Also, aside from the previously mentioned Galileo sit-
uation, the present failures in question are not considered to
be vibration-induced. Thus, an analysis in terms of vibra-
tion and acoustic related effects will be precluded from this
discussion.
One dynamics area that is of concern, and where consid-
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erableresearchhasbeendevotedover the past few years is
pyrotechnic shock. Pyrotechnic shocks or "pyro °' shocks,
are very short-duration, high-frequency shocks produced by
certain flight events such as engine ignition, explosive sep-
aration of booster stages and the release and deployment of
satellites and appendage. Typically, primary attention is
given to the shock transients experienced by the spacecraft
during the vehicle launch stage, whereas on-orbit loads are
considered to be of lower-level and less of a threat to the
structure.
Charles Moening of the Aerospace Corporation, El
Segnndo, California, completed a study in 1984 on the
cause of failure of eighty-eight (88) U.S. Air Force (USAF)
spacecraft and launch vehicles, under USAF Contract No.
F04701-C-0084 (ref. 11). One of the most astounding dis-
coveries of Moening's investigation was that 85 of the 88
anomalies (96.5%) were found to be related to pyrotechnic
events, or occurred shortly after shock events when the
thermal and the vibration environments were relatively
benign. The conclusions of Moening's findings, and the
results of several meaningful dynamic investigations pur-
sued by the Aerospace Corporation as a whole, have
become key parts of MIL-STD-1540 (USAF),"Test
Requirements For Space Vehicles", US AF environmental
test tailoring and design handbooks, and MIL-A-83577
(USAF), "Test Requirements for Moving Mechanical
Assemblies For Space". The overall effect of the suggested
design and test guidelines detailed in these documents, and
as implemented by suppliers of equipment to the Air Force,
,are suggested to have at least partially contributed to the
launch vehicle success the USAF space program is present-
ly enjoying.
THERMAl. AND SOLAR EFFECTS
The Space Environment
Once on orbit, spacecraft must face an array of dissimilar
and hostile environments, most of which are foreign to the
Earth's atmosphere. Among the varied elements satellites
must encounter during their orbital life are high and low
temperature extremes, severe electromagnetic (solar) radia-
tion, atomic particle radiation, low vapor pressure (high
vacuum), and the absence of gravity. In relation to space-
craft appendage, the large temperature fluctuations that can
occur when the satellite moves into the shadow of the Earth
during an eclipse are of primary importance.
During an orbital eclipse or as a consequence of the satel-
lite's orientation in space, one side of the satellite, exposed
to sunlight, may be at about + 150°C whereas the opposite
side, in the shadow and lacing the blackness of space, may
be at -120°C (ref.12). Such large changes of thermal gradi-
ents between station,'u-y and rotating components (solar
array and antenna drive shafts), have been known to cause
unpredictable behavior that includes increased loads, bear-
ing friction and resistance torque on moving surfaces. Also,
since deployables extend from the body of the spacecraft
they, in general, have low thermal capacities and rely main-
ly on passive thermal control. Thus, the proper choice of
materials and space lubricants are vital keys to appendage
on-orbit operation.
Tribology*
The important and critical spacecraft functions provided
by deployable appendage involve the relative movement of
surfaces in contact. In orbit unlubricated metal surfaces can
rapidly weld together or exhibit high friction and wear.
Triboiogy is the science and technology of touching sur-
faces in relative motion, the main topics being friction,
lubrication and wear. A knowledge of tribology is therefore
vital to successful spacecraft design and operation. Since
1972, researchers at the European Space Tribology
Laboratory (ESTL), England, have done extensive R&D
and thermal vacuum testing involving the behavior of
spacecraft mechanisms and lubricants. As noted by Dr. Rob
Rowntree of ESTL, "tribology has an essential role in the
modern spacecraft industry and is, or should be, an integral
part of the design process. It is not a process to be added
when the design is complete" (ref. 13).
It is beyond the scope of this article to assess all the
prevalent aspects of tribology, thus for this di_ussion, only
two major areas of trilx_iogy shall be considered: space
mechanisms and lubricants.
Spacecraft mechanisms are generally made to be non-
reversible. This is due to the fact that satellites are primari-
ly not designed to be recoverable, thus their appendage is
intended to remain in a locked position for the duration of
their orbital life. Early spacecraft had few moving parts and
very short lives. Mechanisms were relatively simple and
conventional terrestrial vacuum lubricants were initially
adequate. Today, the mechanical complexity of satellites
have increased dramatically. Since redundancy of large
satellite appendage such as solar arrays is not possible, par-
allel or serial duplication of their associated drive and
deployment mechanisms is employed to provide a higher
level of reliability. Sound tribological practices and testing
conducted prior to spacecraft design completion have con-
tributed significantly to the improved operation of space-
craft mechanisms in the low temperature, thermal vacuum
of space.
The reliable rotation of solar arrays, gimbals, scanning
mechanisms and momentum wheels in the extreme cold-
ness of space is highly dependent upon the lubricant used
on bearing or mating mechanical interfaces. The two major
classes of space lubricants are dry/solid film and
liquid/fluid lubricants. The primary space solid lubricants
presently used in industry are MoS2, PTFE and Pb (Lead).
Major types of liquid lubricants include refined mineral
oils, synthetic oils (silicones), esters and perfluorinated
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polyethers.
Table2 outlines the pros and cons of dry/solid and liq-
uid/fluid lubricants. As noted, only solid lubrication is
practical for spacecraft mechanisms used at cryogenic tem-
peratures. Another substantial advantage dry lubricating
films is that when applied to bearings, the resulting torques
are independent of temperature and rotational speed. Also,
for certain types of cleanliness requirements, dry lubricants
are preferred. However, dry lubricants perform poorly in
air, and care in handling must therefore be exercised during
the ground test phase where, in addition, much greater
loads than in orbit can be encountered. Some of the pros of
liquid lubricants are they that allow good radial thermal
conductance, produce low torque noise in rotating bearings,
and can be used in air. On the down side, the viscosity of
fluids varies considerably with temperature which is unac-
ceptable in some applications. Also, liquid lubricants have
a small operational temperature range.
*Note: Section based on tribology research ,testing and
published literature issued by the European Space
Tribology Laboratory, UK.
LIMITATIONS OF LABORATORY TESTING
Ground-based testing accounts for roughly 25-30% of the
total cost of a spacecraft, with the average price of a mod-
em communications satellite being in excess of $60 mil-
lion. Thus, the cost- effectiveness of exhaustive environ-
menial testing such as vehicle level vibration, acoustic and
thermal vacuum testing is easily demonstrated in relation to
the satellite's high price tag, and possible financial reper-
cussions of an on-orbit insurance loss.
The key to the effectiveness of any laboratory test is that
it be representative of the intended operating environment
of the test article. The size and complexity of satellite
appendage often requires unique simulation techniques to
achieve this objective. While the quality and confidence in
space simulation test methods have progressed dramatically
since the early 1960s, limitations still remain.
Vibration Testing
Vehicle-level vibration testing is suggested to provide the
most accurate simulation of launch conditions. Due to the
increasing size and weight of today's satellites (3-5 tons),
multi-shaker vibration test systems have become the norm.
But, true launch vibrations occur simultaneously in multi-
ple spacecraft axes, thus requiring the use of a multi-axis
vibration test facility for comparable laboratory reproduc-
tion.
Until recently, spacecraft manufacturers have been with-
out the capability to excite an entire space satellite concur-
rently in all three orthogonal directions. Figure 6 shows a
photo of the Japanese National Aeronautics and Space
Development Agency's (NASDA) Vibration Test Facility
at the Tsukuba Space Center, Japan. The system, which
became operational during the summer of 1991, is capable
of testing satellites weighing up to 4.5 tons in all three axes
(X,Y,Z), without having to reposition the test article. The
NASDA installation, designed by the team of Ling
Dynamic Systems, UK and Akashi Seisakusho, Japan,
employs ten (10) - 48,000 lbf electrodynamic shakers cou-
pled to a cubic vibration table offering a test area of 9 m2
(96 ft 2 ). Presently, it is the largest multi- shaker system in
the world (ref.14).
The European Space and Research Technology Centre
(ESTEC), the Netherlands, the environmental testing arm
of the ESA, is currently pursuing many of the same unique
benefits demonstrated by the NASDA system in their pro-
posed Hydraulic-Shaker Test Facility for testing the large
Ariane payloads, such as the Hermes Spaceplane. Once
complete, the ESTF_ vibration system will utilize several
long- stroke, high force hydraulic exciters to simulate
spacecraft launch conditions.
Another shortcoming of vibration testing is one that does
not involve the application of vibration, but instead the
decision of whether to apply electrical power to the satellite
during test. Moening's forementioned study on Air Force
spacecraft notes that powering-up satellites systems during
vibration testing, while complicating the tests, has made it
possible to detect 'mission- catastrophic' anomalies such as
electrical shorts which would have occurred in the high
acoustic and vibration environment of a launch (under nor-
mal circumstances, power is not apply to satellite
appendage or electrical systems during launch). The objec-
tive of continuous monitoring of perceptive parameters is
to detect intermittent failures that may appear normal dur-
ing the initial on-orbit checkout. Thus, it is to be used as a
diagnostic tool to reveal failures that would otherwise
occur and go undetected during launch, only to surface
later while the spacecraft is on orbit.
This change in directives is further spelled out in MIL-
STD-1540B, of which personnel at the Aerospace
Corporation were key contributors. As stated in the specifi-
cation, for space vehicle qualification testing: "during the
test, electrical and electronic components, even if not oper-
ating during launch, shall be electrically energized and
sequenced through operational modes." However, the doc-
ument also advises the non-application of power to those
components or systems that might suffer damage during
testing, due to energization.
Pyroshock Testing
Pyrotechnic shock testing deficiencies have been outlined
by several practitioners, including Moening (ref. 11),
Chalmers (ref.15), Czjakowski and Rehard (ref.16).
Moening's USAF spacecraft study revealed that inadequa-
cies existed in the use of pyroshock for component, piece
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part,qualification,andsystemleveltestingandscreening.
Chalmersconductedareviewofpyroshocktestechniques
in t990,whichshowedmajorlimitationsintermsofinstru-
mentationmeasurementcapabilitiesandmethodspresently
beingundertakentoincreasetheconfidenceof testing.
CzajkowskiandRehardalsoobservedseveralinstrumenta-
tionproblemswhichinvolveduseofanti-aliasingfilters
andanalog/digitalanalyzers.It wassuggestedthatvery
high-frequencysamplingratesprecludetheuseofthefil-
ters.Theunderlyingconsequenceof thesetestingmethod-
ologyandequipmentlimitationsi thatapossibleundertest
ofthetestarticleresults,whichdoesnotadequatelyprepare
thespacecraftfortheshocklevelsexperiencedduring
launch.
Inaddition,engineershaveaimcitedthatcertain
pyroshocktestspecificationsweretoostringent,andnot
practical.Asanexample,the+ 3 dB tolerance stipulated in
USAF MIL-STD-1540A was widened to + 6 dB in Rev. B,
because the previous specification was not realistic,
extremely difficult for contractors to adhere to, and was not
compatible with industry equipment and test repeatability.
Deployment Testing
Various methods are used for deployment testing which
include neutral-buoyancy testing, air-bearing support sys-
tems, and "zero-g" gravity compensation fixtures. There
are drawbacks to each technique. Neutral-buoyancy tests
have shown to be well-suited for astronaut extra-vehicular
activity (EVA) training and space suit testing, but generally
are not practical or feasible for most conventional space
programs. They require large water reserves and are expen-
sive to maintain. Air-bearing support systems (see figure 6)
offer relative ease of operation and much lower system
cost,; as compared to neutral-buoyancy cells. However,
such setups are often large, bulky and complex. In addition,
such intricate fixturing has been suspected of introducing
added resistance loads to the device under test.
It has been concluded by the engineering community that
it is virtually impossible to simulate the zero gravity ("zero-
g") environment of outer-space in a laboratory test. As long
as the test system is within the bounds of the Earth's atmos-
phere, there will always be some level of gravitational
forces acting upon it. Thus, the objective of "zero-g"
deployment testing is not so much to provide a true replica-
tion of the weightlessness of space, but to suspend the
deployable device in a very low-gravity state by which
forces acting upon it are considered negligible (this is gen-
erally achieved using 1-g off-loading, typically in the
deployment mechanisms vertical plane). Although the test
may not be representative of the environment (due to air
drag, etc.), it does allow spacecraft designers to verify fric-
tion margins and appendage functionality.
The use of "zero-g" test rigs and fixtures have proven to
be very efficient provided the test set-up is simple and there
is no variation of the potential energy of the item under test
(i.e. center of gravity of the test item moves in the vertical
plane). Figure 7 shows the "zero-g" test rig used for
deployment testing of the ESA's OLYMPUS satellite, at
the David Florida Laboratory in Ottawa, Canada. The test
rig, designed and built by Spar Aerospace, Toronto,
Canada, utilizes a series of constant load springs which
were carefully balanced to allow the satellite's solar wings
to take their on-orbit "zero-g" shape with little error
(ref.17).
"Zero-g" test under ambient condition have been very
fruitful, but there is doubt on the value of such test con-
ducted under thermal vacuum conditions. The most impor-
tant concern is the influence of the test rig on the test data.
Since both the deployable and test rig will see virtually the
same thermal conditions inside the chamber, the thermal
influences of the test rig must be accounted for in order for
the test to be considered valid. Also, when deployment tests
are done in a thermal vacuum chamber, a certain thermal
environment is generally chosen (usually, a cold or hot
soak) which will deviate significantly from the real circum-
stances. Thus, it is often very difficult to create representa-
tive temperature gradients.
Thermal Vacuum Testing
Rigorous thermal vacuum (T/V) testing has proved to be
of great value in assessing the reliability of mechanisms
under conditions which simulate the space environment.
The major limitation of T/V testing has been the internal
space capacities of modern chambers. Figure 8 shows the
Galileo Jupiter spacecraft undergoing T/V testing in the
Space Simulator Chamber at JPL. The 25-ft Space
Simulator, built in 1961, has a test volume of 20-ft D X 25-
ft H. Throughout its many years of operation, the facility
has been sufficient for most spacecraft designs. However,
the increasingly wide span of modern solar arrays and size
of iurge deployable structures such as Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) antennas makes practical testing of these
devices in a T/V chamber, even the size of the JPL installa-
tion, unfeasible. Partial solar array deployments are gener-
ally performed under vacuum conditions, with RF antennas
being the only assemblies able to be fully deployed.
T/V chambers capable of handling extremely lengthy
deployables are still a long ways from practical develop-
ment. However, progress has been made by various testing
organizations in an effort to overcome this deficiency. For
example, in 1987, the ESTEC made operational the Large
Space Simulator (LSS). The LSS, shown in figure 9, is the
largest facility of its kind in Europe, with internal chamber
dimensions of 33-ft D X 50-ft H. Uniquely different from
most T/V chambers presently in existence, the LSS utilizes
an advanced motion simulator to provide realistic solar and
thermal profiles, and to simulate the relative spinning
motion of satellites in space. Due to the volume of the LSS,
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theESAHippacrossatellitewasabletobeT/Vtestedin
1989,withit'ssolarpanelsandtelescopebafflesfully
deployedundersimulatedspaceconditions( eefigure10).
SPACECRAFT PYROTECHNICS*
For single-function mechanical operations, the efficiency,
reliability and speed of pyrotechnic actuators ("pyros") are
without parallel. The role of pyros is to aid in the release of
long booms, large antenna dishes and solar arrays;
open/close valves; push/pull loads; and severe wires and
bolts used as launch restraints, etc. However, onboard
explosive firings have themselves been seen as a source of
appendage problems. Self-induced shocks occur principally
when pyrotechnic and pneumatic devices are actuated to
initiate the forementioned events. But, spacecraft dynamic
analysis utilizing computer models and results of ground
testing, have shown that these acceleration levels are much
lower those induced during launch, and exhibit little dam-
age potential to the structure. Additionally, shock and
vibration dampers are commonly employed to limit the
effects of pyrotechnic discharges.
The reliability of spacecraft pyrotechnics has also been
suspect to some observers. The fundamental requirement of
a pyrotechnic device is that it detonate reliably when com-
manded and not under any other circumstance (inadvertent
firing). Although very few cases of non- firing of pyrotech-
nics on-orbit have ever been reported, the predominate
question generally asked by ground controllers during the
early moments of any deployment problem is, "Did the
pyros fire correctly?". This is because many times the only
indication controllers have as to whether a pyrotechnic
explosive actually detonated as commanded, comes from
the mechanical linkage of the appendage in question.
Electrical signals fed back from the closing of micro-
switches as the deployable moves into its operational posi-
tion, signifies pyrotechnic release as well as appendage
deployment. However, other, more indicative methods of
verifying pyro firings, are presently being pursued by sev-
eral spacecraft manufacturers.
Unlike all other hardware onboard a spacecraft, explo-
sive-based components are only usable once. That is to say,
the pyrotechnic to be used fi)r flight can never be fully test-
ed before it is required to operate in space. Confidence can
only be generated by the performance of like items l'wed for
that purpose. Generally, a large number of samples must be
fired in the test program to build any significant level of
confidence. The test program must be comprehensive and
complete; merely firing a few items under given conditions
will not suffice. Also, the number of test items must be
large enough to allow firings under all the various chosen
conditions. But, even after such extensive testing, there is
still no guarantee that the actual units used in the spacecraft
will function correctly in orbit. Thus, for reasons of safety
and reliability, pyrotechnics are also duplicated in series or
in parallel, according to defined requirements of failure
tolerance.
*Note: Section based on reference 18
SPACECRAFT OUTGASSING
Spacecraft outgassing, or "ballooning" as is sometimes
referred, is a phenomenon that occurs as a spacecraft transi-
tions from one atmospheric pressure level to another. The
most common form of outgassing generally happens during
vehicle launch. Under the normal air pressure conditions
of Earth, components such as insulation thermal blankets fit
loosely over the body of the spacecraft, and are sealed. The
only openings in the blanket are located around rotating
shafts, etc. It is known that large areas of material with
high outgassing rates are only pumped though such small
orifices in space. During ascent into space, the air pressure
surrounding the satellite decreases, causing a pressure
imbalance between the interior and exterior of the spaee-
craft. This forces the air trapped beneath the blanket to be
pushed outward, thus the ballooning effect is created.
While it is understood that some outgassing will always
occur, obviously the looser the fit of the thermal blanket to
the spacecraft, the more pronounced will be the ballooning.
The importance of this scenario is that the blanket will gen-
erally stay in this inflated state as long as it remains in
space. The danger to appendage is that when instructed to
deploy, there is a much greater chance of it snagging on a
piece of the blanket, possibly creating an incurable deploy-
ment problem.
Another problem with outgassing is that the condition is
very difficult to detect during ground testing. Because of
the high pumping rates required (the pumping speed of
space is essentially infinite), the event is extremely difficult
to simulate with a thermal vacuum chamber. The problem
becomes more of a challenge as the size of the chamber
increases, which is necessary for vehicle-level testing.
A great deal more research needs to be done in this
area(Scialdone (ref. 19) and other researchers have done
significant studies in this area), which has potentially cata-
strophic effects on future satellites. Keeping in mind that
the outgassing rate varies with each spacecraft, and is influ-
enced by the size and complexity of the design.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM ANIK-E2
On April 12, 1991 Telesat Canada developed difficulties
with the K-band and C-band antennas of its Anik E2 satel-
lite not being able to deploy either after the initial com-
mand sequence was sent to the satellite. An anomaly team
comprised of engineers from the spacecraft design team,
Spar Aerospace Ltd., Canada and GE Astro Space, New
Jersey, was quickly formed. The K-band antenna unexpect-
edly freed itself on April 19, while the C-band antenna
120
remained stuck. The GE/Spar team later utilized a series of
thermal and dynamic maneuvers to finally free the antenna
on July 3, 1991. The extensive series of measures, which
included a 'dual spin turn' reversal of the satellite, were
previously unprecedented for a recovery attempt of a com-
mercial satellite (ref. 19).
Although the satellite was nearly claimed as an $208 mil-
lion ($240 million Canadian dollars) insurance write-off,
several valuable lessons were learned from the Anik expe-
rience.
1. Technical ingenuity is the key. The successful deploy-
ment of the Anik's C-band antenna was the result of the
quick response, timely decisions and carefully planned
recovery maneuvers issued by the 12-man team of Spar
Aerospace and GE Astro Space engineers. The GE/Spar
team, whose activities were coordinated by Doug Jung of
Spar, made several critical decisions during the early
moments of the Anik experience, including the recommen-
dation to Telesat Canada officials not to deploy the satel-
lite's solar arrays. The extension of the spacecraft's solar
panels would have prevented any viable use of dynamic
spin maneuvers to free the stuck antenna. In addition,
meticulous calculations were also performed by the team
used to estimate the rate of spin necessary to overcome the
resistance of the presumed thermal blanket holding the
appendage, without damaging the antenna during the
deployment attempt.
What can be learned by other spacecraft manufacturers is
that their most valuable asset is indeed their employees.
The best resources available to help remedy an appendage
problem usually comes from within the organization(s)
responsible fi_r the design and test of the spacecraft. Thus,
in general, the same technical shall that is responsible h_r
the satellite's construction, should be utilized in the recov-
ery effort.
2. Satellite nmneuvers are effective salvage tools. The
Anik E2 recovery experience wax not the first instance of
dynamic and thermal maneuvers being used to free
appendage. However, the exercise was unprecedented for
the use of exhaustive procedures. The immediate lesson
learned is that, although the satellite may be sufficiently
insured for a loss, the owner should pursue every conceiv-
able exercise (within the design limitations of the space-
craft and with concurrence of insurance underwriters) to
achieve recovery. Secondly, since such maneuvers have
been met with success, they should continue to be used to
the extent ix_ssible.
3. Innovative spacecraft designs are necessary. The
Satcom 5000 satellite platform, designed and manufactured
by GE Astro Space, was clearly a well thought-out design
that contributed greatly to the success of the Anik. Had the
solar arrays not been designed to be operational in a stowed
position, the owners would have been forced to deploy the
solar panels before the batteries were depleted. As a conse-
quence, maneuvers to free the stuck antennas would have
been virtually impossible to accomplish with the solar
arrays extended.
As previously mentioned, spacecraft appendage designs
are generally non-reversible and very unforgiving. As an
example, the NASA Galileo spacecraft design does not
allow for the remote deployment reversal of it's high gain
antenna. Had such a capability been employed in it's
design, the present status of the antenna might have easily
been corrected. In light of such instances, spacecraft
designers should make detailed evaluations of present and
future designs, and employ creative techniques to allow
potential appendage problems in space to be recoverable.
4. Satellite spares and ground simulation are of vital
importance. Remote failure analysis of a satellite is a task
often difficult to visualize without some frame of reference.
This is mainly due to the fact that telemetry data read back
from the satellite is often non- conclusive. The Anik-E1,
which was to be launched several months following the
Anik-E2, was effectively used to pinpoint the cause of the
Anik-E2 failure. Also, numerous environmental tests utiliz-
ing the Anik-E1 were conducted at the David Florida
Laboratory, Ottawa, Canada. These tests ascertained the
antenna could be deployed under various failure scenarios;
quantified the forces required and the forces it could with-
stand; and verified any improvements that would be made
on Anik-E1.
It should be noted that engineers at JPL are currently uti-
lizing the flight spare of the Galileo spacecraft antenna to
create an accurate picture of the antenna deployment situa-
tion. The spare is also being used to plan the course of fea-
sible deployment events during the spacecraft's second
Earth flyby in December 1992 (ref. 10).
Thus, the importance of functional flight spares available
on the ground cannot be over emphasized. The ability to
identify the source of an deployment problem, and under-
take recovery maneuvers in the laboratory without conse-
quence to the in-orbit spacecraft, make them invaluable
tools.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Spacecraft failures are perceived as technical risks of
being in the satellite business. But, there are still steps that
can be taken by owners and manufacturers to help reduce
these risks.
1. Continuation of spacecraft technical meetings, sym-
posiums and workshops. Space symposiums and confer-
ences such as the one today are definitely an outgrowth of
the tough times experienced in the 1980s, and are a vital
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part of a plan for industry as a whole to learn and grow
together. Spacecraft safety and reliability should continue
to be the main focus, with increased participation by other
related technical societies. In particular, those organizations
specializing in areas such as space tribology and structural
mechanics.
2. Public disclosures should be made by manufacturers
that have experienced failures, to help preclude future
anomalies. The consensus is, when it comes to matters of
this nature, it is in the interest of all industry to have an
open discourse concerning spacecraft failures. Despite the
competitiveness of the space market and the nature of the
business, there are no true winners or losers when one
speaks in terms of a loss of a satellite. In the end, world-
wide insurance premiums will increase, making it difficult
for all manufacturers to obtain spacecraft insurance, and the
overall confidence level in space travel will be again be left
in doubt.
3. Increased test effectiveness. Testing builds a higher
level of confidence, validates designs, and increases space-
craft reliability. System and vehicle level testing have
shown the most promise in evaluating the performance of
appendage. As noted by Trafton (ref.4), many of the recent
deployment failures could have been uncovered only by
testing at the vehicle level, i.e., after the deployable was fit-
ted to the spacecraft.
Although there is certainly a level of testing that a space-
craft manufacturer cannot go to because it is too cost pro-
hibitive, efforts should also be taken to provide a closer
simulation of the launch and space environments. Test
stages should follow closely the sequence of events that the
spacecraft experiences from launch to the end of its orbital
life. For example, vibration, acoustic and pyroshock testing
should be performed in the manner they will most likely
occur during launch. In general, a satellite is subjected to a
combination of dynamic environments. However, to sim-
plify testing, they are usually simulated ,separately.
4. Plan for failure. There is generally a very narrow "win-
dow of opportunity" during the early stages of an event
such as a solar array deployment anomaly (typically less
than 24 hours), before spacecraft batteries are depleted.
This does not give manufacturers much time to assembly
an anomaly team or come up with an effective plan of
recovery, if salvage attempts are to be successful. Thus,
many of the owners of spacecraft that have experienced
appendage-related problems have been caught totally off-
guard.
In the future, it is foreseen that spacecraft anomaly teams
will become as common an occurrence as design teams.
They will be formed prior to vehicle launch, and possibly
wait in a "standby" mode until needed. Once called into
action, the probability of their success will rely heavily on
such factors as real-time data analysis, thermal and dynam-
ic maneuvers (if necessary), and knowing the safety/design
limits of the spacecraft.
FINAL REMARKS
The intent of this article was to raise the general level of
awareness concerning on-orbit appendage deployment
problems. It was the author's hope to spark sufficient inter-
est in the area such that spacecraft manufacturers would
realize the seriousness of these aberrations, and the possible
repercussions of dismissing them as mere random occur-
rences. Also, it is hoped that the lessons learned from these
situations will help preclude future appendage problems, or
at least provide owners and manufacturers with a better
idea of how to deal with them.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT SPACECRAFT
APPENDAGE DEPLOYMENT ANOMALIES
SPACECRAFT/
YEAR LAUNCHED PROBLEM CAUSE
APPLE (1981) #
INSAT 1A (1982)#
INSAT 1B (1983)*
ARABSAT 1A (1985)*
TVSAT 1 (1987) ^
OLYMPUS 1 (1989)*
GALILEO (1989)#
MAGELLAN (1990)#
ANIK-E2 (1991)*
JERS-1 (1992)*
Jammed Solar Array
Solar Sail Failed To
Deploy
Unable To Position Solar
Array
Failure To Deploy Solar
Array, C-band Antenna
Failure To Deploy Solar
Array
Total Power Loss In One
Solar Array
High Gain Antenna Failed
To Deploy
Solar Array Failed To
Latch
K and C-band Antenna
Deployment Problems
Radar Antenna Failed To
Deploy
Solar Array Latch Stuck
Inoperative Mechanical Latch
Thermal Binding Of
Deployment Mechanism
Mechanical Interference
Deployment Latching
Mechanism Failed to Unlock
Electrical Short In Cable
Harness
Cold Welding In Ball And
Socket Joint
Microswitch Misadjusted
Thermal Blanket Interference
Wrong Software Command
Sequence
Note: Based on failure summary generated by T.W. Trafton of the Aerospace Company, 1991.
* Problem resolved or full recovery of spacecraft achieved
# Spacecraft usable without functioning of deployable
^ Spacecraft claimed as loss
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FIGURE i. ARTIST'S CONCEPTION OF SPACE STATION FREEDOM. (ARTIST-
TOM BUZBEE)
126
Nominal operations sequence for the Launch and Early-Orbit Phase (LEOdP)
@@ ®
/
/@
/
!
III
NO EVENT DEFINITION
1 SEPARATION
2 $2 ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT
3 ATSR ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT
4 SOLAR GENERATOR ARM DEPLOYMENT
5 SOLAR GENERATOR PANEL DEPLOYMENT
8,7 SAR ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT
8,9 SCATTEROMETER ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT
FIGURE 2. THE EUROPEAN REMOTE-SENSING SATELLITE, ERS-I, ON-ORBIT
DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE. (COURTESY OF THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND
ESA BULLETIN)
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FIGURE 3. SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR (SAR) ANTENNA OF ERS-I
UNDERGOING GROUND DEPLOYMENT TESTING. (COURTESY OF THE EUROPEAN
SPACE AGENCY AND ESA BULLETIN)
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FIGURE 4. FULL DEPLOYMENT OF GALILEO FLIGHT MODEL, HIGH GAIN
ANTENNA (HGA) AT JPL. (COURTESY OF THE JET PROPULSION LABORATORY)
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FIGURE 5. ENGINEERING TEST SATELLITE, ETS-I, UNDERGOING VIBRATION
TESTING AT NASDA'S TSUKUBA SPACE CENTER, JAPAN. THE VIBRATION
SYSTEM IS PRESENTLY THE LARGEST MULTI-SHAKER TEST FACILITY IN THE
WORLD. (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL SPACE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, JAPAN)
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FIGURE 6. SOLAR ARRAY DEPLOYMENT TESTING USING AN AIR-BEARING
SUPPORT SYSTEM AT GE ASTRO SPACE, NJ. (COURTESY OF GE ASTRO
SPACE)
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FIGURE 7. SPECIAL "ZERO-GRAVITY" DEPLOYMENT TEST RIG USED TO TEST
OLYMPUS SATELLITE AT THE DAVID FLORIDA LABORATORY, CANADA.
(COURTESY OF CANADIAN CROWN)
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FIGURE 8. NASA GALILEO SPACECRAFT IN 25-FT SPACE SIMULATOR
CHAMBER AT JPL. (COURTESY OF THE JET PROPULSION LABORATORY)
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FIGURE 9. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY'S (ESA) HIPPARCOS SATELLITE
UNDERGOING THERMAL VACUUM TESTING IN THE LARGE SPACE SIMULATOR
(LSS) FACILITY AT ESTEC, THE NETHERLANDS. (COURTESY OF THE
EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND ESA BULLETIN)
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FIGURE i0. ESA'S HIPPARCOS SATELLITE BEING ROTATED ABOUT ITS SPIN
AXIS WITH SOLAR PANELS FULLY DEPLOYED, AT THE LARGE SPACE
SIMULATOR (LSS) FACILITY AT ESTEC, THE NETHERLANDS. (COURTESY OF
THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND ESA BULLETIN)
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FIGURE ii. TELESAT CANADA'S ANIK-E2 SATELLITE. (COURTESY OF SPAR
AEROSPACE, LTD.)
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